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Further Comment on the Kilby/Weeks
Debate: An Empirical Rejoinder
JOHN F. WEEKS
Robin Cohen's contribution to the debate over the role of trade unions in
the Nigerian economy is an example of the state of the analysis of trade
union impact in developing countries. As the situation stands, those who
are unconvinced of the impact of trade unions on wages argue that the
quantitative data is ambiguous at best, while the proponents of trade union
power present little contrary quantitative evidence, basing their case on
their interpretation of political events through detailed recitation and invo-
cation of authorities.' While Cohen's "evidence" provides us with a look
at the political literature on Nigerian trade unions, it does not take us far
in understanding their economic role. From reading the note, one would
conclude that economic forces played little or no role in wage determination
in Nigeria. I suggest this is an overemphasis, and below I seek to show
that primary emphasis should be placed on economic factors.
The argument of Cohen and those who agree with him fails to draw the
crucial distinction between the forms or mechanisms of wage setting and
the underlying forces of wage determination. His argument deals only
with the mechanism of wage determination in Nigeria, which he correctly
identifies as political; but by thus restricting himself, he is diverted from
the causes of wage movements, which are economic. Unions in Nigeria have
acted autonomously to influence wages, but only within narrowly defined
1 [Editor: In all footnotes, it is assumed that the citations in Cohen's preceding com-
ment have been read.] Invocation of authorities is also possible for the other side; see
Berg, "Urban Real Wages: Comment."
Lecturer in Economics, Ahmadu Bello University at Zaria, Nigeria, and Fellow, Center
for Research on Economic Development, University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. Much
of the data in this comment was compiled in 1967 while he was a Research Fellow of
the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research at the University of Ibadan.
The author wishes to thank Chris Allen, Department of History, Ahmadu Bello Univer-
sity, and J. B. Knight, Institute of Economics and Statistics, University of Oxford, for
reading and commenting on an earlier draft.
166 John F. Weeks
limits established by economic factors. While it can be argued that trade
unions have pressed the wage level to the upper boundary of these limits
at times, they have not been able to significantly affect the limits themselves.
This role is in fact very similar to that played by trade unions in developed
countries, where both the limits and the forms of wage determination are
economic.2
As a consequence of the emphasis on forms, the debate has shifted from
the question, have trade unions in Nigeria affected wages, to the question,
have trade unions in Nigeria played an important political role? I shall re-
turn to Kilby's original assertion, that trade unions in Nigeria "have played
an important role in mobilizing, magnifying, and channeling the discontent
of government employees who have suffered a gradual erosion of their
money wage; these union activities have resulted in more frequent wage
tribunals and in larger awards than would otherwise have been the case."3
My argument will be that wage levels in Nigeria have been basically de-
termined by economic conditions, though superficially through political
mechanisms.
General Pattern of Wage Movements in Nigeria
The first question one must ask when analyzing the impact of trade unions
on wages in Nigeria is, what has been the pattern of wage movements in
Nigeria-have wages risen unusually fast? None of the authors in this ex-
change have dealt adequately with this question. Warren rests his case
on a wage series for a single city (Lagos), reproduced from a paper by
Berg presented in 1961.4 Kilby provides more data, but because he does
not explain his methodology, it is ambiguous.5
I offer tables 1-3, which bring the Berg data up to date and provide data
on real and money wages for several additional Nigerian cities for selected
periods. I have omitted the 1939-46 war period because evidence is at best
slim, and as Berg has pointed out, the apparent rise in real wages during
these years is largely illusory-a consequence of using the absurdly inac-
curate wartime cost-of-living index.6 It should be added, however, that
2 For an excellent discussion of this, see Harold Levinson, "Pattern Bargaining: A Case
Study of the Automobile Workers," Quarterly Journal of Economics 74 (May 1960):
296-317.
3Kilby article, p. 500.4 The series was published in Melville J. Herskovits and Mitchell Harwitz, Economic
Transition in Africa (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 199-238,
but the paper, "Real Income Trends in West Africa, 1939-60," was presented at a
Conference on Indigenous and Induced Elements in the Economies of Sub-Saharan
Africa held by the Committee on Economic Growth of the Social Science Research
Council, at Northwestern University, 16-18 November 1961.
5 Kilby's article; also available in reprinted form with minor changes as chap. 9 in
his Industrialization in an Open Economy: Nigeria 1945-66 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1969). See also fn. 25 below.
6 Berg, "Real Income Trends," in Economic Transition, p. 230 if., and Berg, "Urban
Real Wages: Comment," fnn. 9, 12, 13. Anyone wishing to investigate the "field"
methods used in compiling the index, and its use in the wage setting, should see Nigeria,
Colonial Office, Report of the Cost of Living Committee, Lagos, Nigeria, 1942 (London:
Crown Agents for the Colonies, 1942); Memorandum, "Cost of Living Bonus for Gov-
ernment Labour in Lagos," Circular no. 27/1941, M.P. no. 38731/S.I. Lagos, 8 Decem-
ber 1941; and Memorandum, "Interim Cost of Living Bonus," Circular no. 26/1942,
M.P. no. 38371, Lagos, 28 May 1942.
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if Bauer's more accurate index of selected imports is used, real wages in
Lagos were actually lower in 1947 than in 1939.7 During this period real
wages rose significantly above the 1939 level only in 1942.8
Having dealt with the war years, 3 cases of wage adjustment are left
to consider: 1950-55, 1959-60, and 1964. Tables 1-3 provide the relevant
data. Table 1 provides indexes of money wages for unskilled government
workers for 7 cities for 1946-54. Rather than pursue whether the substantial
wage increases resulted from political forces at large in the land, I shall
consider the economic trends of the period, which set the context within
which the wage increases of 1952-55 were made possible. This was, by all
indicators, a period of unskilled labor shortage during which unskilled
wages were being forced up throughout the economy.
TABLE 1
INDEXES OF THE UNSKILLED GOvERNMENT WORKERS' STARTING RATES
FOR SELECTED NIGERIAN CITIES, 1946-54
PORT
YEAR LAGOS IBADAN BENIN HARCOURT ENUGU KADUNA KANO
1946........100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1947...... 103 107 100 102 103 111 110
1948...... 103 107 100 102 103 125 110
1949...... 103 107 100 102 103 127 110
1950...... 103 119 126 102 103 154 110
1951...... 106 119 134 115a 128 154 112
1952...... 131 156a 150 135 151 177 157
1953...... 137 169 180 146 164 184 161
1954...... 149a 204b 224a 152a 186a 234b 191a
(1954) ... . .. (221) (235) (165) (198) (221)a (181)
SOURCES: Quarterly Reportfs] of the Department of Labour were the most frequently used.
For complete sources giving the reference for each rate change for 12 cities from 1934 to
1964 (over 180 in all), see Weeks, "Wage Behavior," pp. 217-24. Those interested in the
original data and sources can obtain them by writing to the author.
NOTE: This wage series and those in the following tables differ from those of Berg, "Real
Income Trends," in Economic Transition; Gerald K. Helleiner, Peasant Agriculture, Govern-
ment, and Economic Growth in Nigeria (Homewood, Ill.: Richard Irwin, 1966); and Kilby,
Industrialization, chap. 9. All 3 sources have omissions, particularly for 1951-54. When
a wage change did not occur on 1 January, an average was calculated, with each rate
weighted by the number of months it was in effect during the year in question.
a Two rate changes during the year.
b Three rate changes during the year.
Regional government rate.
7 Peter T. Bauer, West African Trade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1954), p. 421.
8 John F. Weeks, "Wage Behavior, Rural-Urban Income Trends, and Wage Policy in
Nigeria" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1969), pp. 127-36. This conclusion holds
in each case for the 12 cities covered by my dissertation. For elaboration on sources,
see note to table 1.
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While the Department of Labor reports for these years, 1946-54, bear
out my thesis, I shall not rely on these sources, since they are of dubious
reliability. Note that in each case in table 1, the unskilled wage was rela-
tively stable from 1947 to 1950 (1951 in some cases), then rose precipitously
from 1952 to 1954. Is there any evidence that this could have been in re-
sponse to tightening labor markets and a general rise in wage levels-that
the allowable limits of wage behavior had changed? There is such evidence.
Further, there is evidence of acute labor surplus during 1947-50. This sub-
stantiates the conclusion that wage levels were steady (in money terms)
during a period of labor surplus (1947-50), and rose during a period of
labor shortage (1952-54). Political forces are not rejected-the Kilby-
Warren-Cohen arguments may be valid-but political forces emerge as a
response to economic conditions.
World War II had brought stagnant real wages for urban workers, but
a decline in money and real incomes in rural areas." The latter war years
ushered in rural recovery with normalization of international trade, and
the postwar years were spectacularly prosperous for farmers. Though there
is no evidence of migration during the period, it is unquestionable that the
attractiveness of farming as a livelihood increased greatly.'0 In spite of
this, the demobilization of Nigerian servicemen flooded urban labor markets
with job seekers."
It is not surprising, therefore, to find that in response to this labor surplus,
a policy of wage restraint was pursued by the colonial masters. The Miller
Report of 1947 restructured wages but granted only token increases in a
few areas (Lagos workers, for example, received a one pence per day in-
crease), and a few rates were actually cut (Warri, for example).12 The Mil-
ler Report was followed by a wage freeze. Of 12 major Nigerian cities, only
2 received rate increases in 1948, 2 in 1949, 3 in 1950, and 5 in 1951.13 Seven
of the 12 increases were for Northern Region cities which had begun the
postwar period at much lower wage levels than in the south (and where,
it might be added, there were relatively few wage earners and a virtual
absence of political agitation). The Lagos rate was constant from January
1947 (Miller Report) to December 1951. This wage freeze was terminated,
not primarily by political agitation, but by changing labor market condi-
tions.
9 Berg, "Real Income Trends," in Economic Transition, p. 203 if.
'Ibid., also Weeks, "Wage Behavior," p. 137 if., for tables comparing producer
prices and incomes for growers of cocoa, palm products, and groundnuts with govern-
ment unskilled wages in 12 cities.
11 Over 96,000 had been demobilized by 1946, of which 61,500 had registered for
employment; only 19,500 had been placed. A year later 117,000 had been demobilized.
However, in 1947 those placed in jobs had risen to 37.6 percent, from 31.7 percent the
year before. Nigeria, Annual Report of the Department of Labour (Lagos: Government
Printer), for 1947 and 1948, p. 33 and p. 55 respectively. Hereafter cited Annual Report
with year(s).
12 Nigeria, Report on Unestablished and Daily Rated Government Servants, 1947
(Lagos: Government Printer, 1947), p. 4.
3 Lagos, Ibadan, Benin, Sapele, Warri, Port Harcourt, Enugu, Kano, Kaduna, Zaria,
Jos, and Ilorin.
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Changing Labor Market Conditions, 1952-55
Changes in the terms of trade between town and country were the pri-
mary force leading to the wage increases of 1952-55. The rapidly growing
rural prosperity drew workers from the urban areas, which stimulated the
colonial government to raise wages to attract labor.
While money wages of unskilled government workers remained virtually
frozen between 1947 and 1951, cocoa, palm products, and groundnut prices
increased by 100 to 200 percent.'4 As one would expect, this generated an
urban labor shortage as cash crop farmers, with their higher current incomes
and expectations of continued improvement, hired labor to expand cultiva-
tion. The Department of Labor reported in 1952 that government and
private business found it difficult to recruit labor, and that "contractors for
roadworks, bridge-building, and other buildings found it difficult to retain
their labour force...."15
But there is no need to rely on indirect evidence of rising rural prosperity
or vague quotes from government reports. Galletti, Dina, et al., in their
thorough study of Nigerian cocoa farmers, involving extensive fieldwork,
reported for the years 1953-54:
Assuming that he worked twenty days in a month a farm labourer could make about
£4 a month without difficulty and get in addition over 5s. worth of food. This was
better remuneration than that of house servants or messengers in the cities and com-
pared quite favorably with the salaries of junior clerks, mechanics or traders on a
small scale.'6
TABLE 2
INDEXES OF SELECTED UNSKILLED WORKERS' MONEY WAGE
RA-Es IN NIGERIA, 1950-54
GOVERNMENT UNSKILLED a
YEAR CONSTRUCTION PEASANT
AGRICULTURE Lagos Port Harcourt Kano
1950.......... 100 ... 100 100 100
1951.......... 124 100 103 113 102
1952.......... 173 114 127 132 143
1953.......... 221 133 133 143 146
1954.......... 248 147 144 162 174
SOURCES: Construction and peasant agriculture indexes are from Helleiner, Peasant Agri-
culture p. 447, and A. Aboyade, "Capital Formation in Nigeria" (Ph.D. diss., Cambridge
University, 1960), vol. 2.
* See table 1. The highest rate in each year was used.
4 If 1947 = 100 in each case, the index of the producer (marketing board) price for
cocoa, palm oil, palm kernels, and groundnuts in 1951 was 332, 282, 336, and 225
respectively. Weeks, "Wage Behavior," p. 137 if.
1 Annual Report, 1951-52, p. 9.
6 R. Galletti, K. D. S. Baldwin, and I. O. Dina, Nigerian Cocoa Farmers: An Eco-
nomic Survey of Yoruba Cocoa Farming Families (London: Oxford University Press,
1956), pp. 214-15. With a standard government work month of 26 days, a Lagos un-
skilled worker earned less than £4.10.0 a month between April 1952 and November
1954, with a higher cost of living. Such workers, of course, earned less in other cities
(£22.18.6. in Ibadan, for example, during the same period).
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Evidence of the consequential upward pressure on urban wages is avail-
able and presented in table 2. Aboyade's data clearly show that government
starting rates lagged behind private sector wages for construction labor and
peasant agriculture during the period 1950-54. Other fragmentary evidence
of private sector rates substantiate this relationship.17
Further evidence of labor shortage is provided by the colonial govern-
ment's decision to end all restrictions on immigration to Lagos on 10 Decem-
ber 1952 (which had been introduced during the war). This decision re-
flected the reported shortages of labor for private firms and government
during 1952 and into 1953.18
This evidence indicates that while political arguments about the wooing
of wage earners by political parties are not irrelevant (any other behavior
by essentially narrow based political parties would be strange indeed), it
misses the essential causality. It indicates that Warren is incorrect when
he writes, "the broad changes in real wages have borne no simple relation-
ship to the general prosperity of the [Nigerian] economy" between 1950-51
and 1959-60.19 While I would not argue that the relationship is "simple," it
was clearly direct. The constancy of money wages between 1947 and 1951
reflected the postwar labor surplus, and the subsequent rise in money wages
reflected the increasing prosperity of the economy which eliminated this
surplus.
This is not to say that politics played no part. Why the Western Region
government responded by raising wages more than did the other govern-
ments is in part political (as well as being the result of increased revenues
the regional government derived from cocoa prosperity).20 There is a
political element to be considered here, but I argue that economic forces
set the limits for political action.
Having dealt with the period 1950-55, I turn to more recent trends. Table
3 provides a real wage series for 7 cities for the period 1953-69.21 The data
include the period from the regionalization constitution in 1954 to the end
of overt party politics with the coup of 1966.
The data indicate trends rather dismaying for those who argue that trade
unions "have played an important role in mobilizing, magnifying, and chan-
neling the discontent of government employees who have suffered a gradual
erosion of their money wage... ."22 While population figures for Nigeria
are unreliable, one can roughly list the 7 cities in table 3 in order of
17 Compare, for example, private sector rates to the prevailing government rate in
the same area in Annual Report, 1949-50 and 1951-52, p. 61 and p. 73 respectively,
and the Quarterly Reports for these years.
""Annual Report, 1952-53, pp. 13-14.
19 Warren, "Urban Real Wages," p. 35.
20 It should be pointed out, however, that wages in Western Nigeria were raised sev-
eral times from 1950 to 1955 (7 times in Ibadan alone), and only one of these was
initiated by the Action Group.
21 Only Lagos has earlier cost of living data. See Berg, "Real Income Trends," in
Economic Transition, pp. 234-35, for a discussion of the unreliability of the 1949-52
figures. Price indexes are available for several cities of former Western Nigeria beginning
in 1953, but include local foodstuffs only.
22Kilby's article, p. 500.
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TABLE 3
REAL WAGE INDEXES FOR UNSKILLED GOVERNMENT WORKERS
FOR SELECTED NIGERIAN CrIIES, 1953-69
PORT
YEAR LAGOS IBADAN BENINa ENUGU HARCOURT KADUNA KANO
1953....... 100 100 100 100 ... ...
1954....... 103 112 110 111 ... ... ...
1955....... 126 191 159 149 ... ... ...
1956....... 116 177 169 139 ... ... ...
1957....... 114 173 166 139 100 100 ...
1958....... 114 184 175 136 99 98 100
1959....... 123 194 188 145 104 101 102
1960....... 129 200 178 159 111 112 114
1961....... 122 186 173 154 103 104 110
1962....... 117 172 151 127 100 98 105
1963....... 117 184 168 132 104 102 107
1964....... 150 219 217 189 129 128 138
1965....... 144 212 201 188 122 124 132
1966....... 132 190 147 162 120 116 116
1967....... 137 157 164 ... ... 120 114
1968....... 134 162 177 ... ... 118 121
1969....... 123 164 153 ... ... 104 114
a Money wages are deflated by all-inclusive cost-of-living indexes,
Benin, in which the index included local foodstuffs only.
except for the case of
TABLE 4
REAL WAGE RATES OF GROWTH FOR UNSKILLED GOVERNMENT WORKERS
FOR SELECTED NIGERIAN CITIES, 1953-69
(In Percentages)
RATE TYPE PORT
AND LAGOS IBADAN BENIN ENUGU HARCOURT KADUNA KANOa
PERIOD
Average annual
1953-65...... 3.7 9.3 8.4 7.3 ... ... ...
1953-69...... 1.4 4.0 3.3 ... ... ... ...
1957-65...... ... ... ... ... 2.8 3.0 4.6
1957-69...... ... ... ... ... ... 0.4 1.3
Compounded
1953-65...... 3.1 6.4 6.0 5.4 ... ... ...
1953-69...... 1.3 3.1 2.7 ... ... ..
1957-65...... ... ... ... ... 2.5 2.8 4.1
1957-69...... ... ... ... ... ... 0.4 1.2
Adjusted b
1953/55-1969 1.6 1.3 2.2 3.3 ... ... ...
1957/59-1969 ... ... ... ... 3.0 1.3 1.1
SOURCES: See table 1.
a Base year 1958.
b The adjusted rate gives the compounded annual rate for each series "smoothed out" by
a 3 year moving average, using latest data in each case (1969 except for Enugu and Port
Harcourt). Its purpose is to demonstrate that my choice of end years in previous rows
does not bias the results. Indeed, inspection of the adjusted rate indicates that the end
years chosen for the average annual and compounded rates are biased against my argu-
ment. Base years other than 1953 give much lower growth rates.
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descending proportion of recorded wage earners to the total labor force:
Lagos, Port Harcourt, Enugu, Kaduna, Kano, Ibadan, and Benin.23 This
ordering is striking when compared to table 4-the cities with the highest
proportion of wage earners had the lowest average and compounded rates
of growth of real wages for the period 1953-65. Real wages rose least in
Lagos and Enugu and most in Ibadan and Benin. For 1957-65, real wages
again rose least in Port Harcourt, slightly more in Kaduna, and fastest in
Kano. If trade unions possessed the power to protect their members against
erosion of real wages, they did not use it very rationally.
Further, bringing the data up to the present, we see that the increase in
real wages has been meager indeed. There is, of course, no cost of living
data for Enugu and Port Harcourt after 1966, but for the 5 remaining cities,
real wages in no case increased an average annual rate in excess of 4.0
percent (or at a compounded rate in excess of 3.1 percent). In 3 of the 5
cases the rate was less than 2.0 percent per annum! Such meager increases
raise questions as to the political potency of Nigerian trade unions.
These rates of increase are particularly meager when placed against rele-
vant yardsticks. According to official statistics, Nigeria's gross domestic
product at constant prices grew at an average annual rate of 6.8 percent
(compound rate of 6.0 percent) from 1958-59 to 1966-67.24 If we assume
that population has been growing at 3.0 percent (which is quite a high
estimate, notwithstanding the ridiculous rate of over 5 percent implied
by the 1953 and 1964 censuses), then average per capita income for the
population as a whole has been increasing at 3.8 percent per year (3.0
percent compounded). Though the GDP figures (as is the case for most
developing countries) are highly unreliable, we can conclude that govern-
ment wage earner real incomes have not apparently increased as much as
overall incomes, and to the extent government rates are indicative of private
rates, wage earners in the enumerated sector have done no better and per-
haps worse than the population as a whole." This evidence indicates that
the current exchange should be over why trade unions have been so unsuc-
cessful in "mobilizing, magnifying, and channeling the discontent of govern-
ment employees," not the reverse.
Not only have government real wage rates increased little in absolute
terms, the increase is hardly in the same league with government real wage
rates elsewhere in English-speaking Africa. Table 5 compares the move-
ments in real wages in the capitals of Nigeria, Uganda, and Kenya. This
231 would accept that the order of Enugu and Kaduna, as well as of Kano and Ibadan,
might be reversed.
2 Nigeria, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1967 (Lagos: Federal Office of Statistics,
1968), p. 138. Kilby (Industrialization, p. 281) provides a comparison of urban real
wages and per capita income. However, the results are questionable: (1) he does not
tell us what assumption he makes about population growth; (2) the series spans the
years in which the basis of calculating GDP changed, which is why an unbroken series
cannot be pushed beyond 1957, at least if it is to be meaningful; (3) a small point, his
index of real wages for Kaduna has the base year 1953, but the official price index did
not begin until 1957 for this city; and (4) his data end in 1965.
25 Th strong link between public and private sector wages represents a major ele-
ment in the arguments of both Warren and Kilby.
Further Comment on the Kilby/Weeks Debate 173
TABLE 5
INDEXES OF REAL WAGE RATES FOR UNSKILLED WORKERS IN
UGANDA, KENYA, AND NIGEmA CAPITALS, 1951-68
KAMPALA NAIROBI LAGOS
YEAR UGANDA KENYA NIGERIA
1951.................. 100 100 100
1952.................. .110 108 132
1953.................. 76 113 133
1954.................. 90 134 137
1955.................. 137 160 168
1956.................. 147 176 154
1957.................. 159 179 152
1958.................. 154 177 152
1959.................. 189 188 159
1960.................. 200 202 172
1961.................. 173 209 163
1962.................. 253 217 156
1963.................. 250 263 156
1964.................. 343 304 200
1965.................. 300 287 192
1966.................. 302 280 176
1967.................. 294 285 183
1968.................. 311 283 179
1954................ 100 100 100
1968................ 346 211 131
SOURCES: (1) Uganda, Statistical Abstract for 1961, 1964, 1967, 1968, Walter Elkan, Mi-
grants and Proletarians: Urban Labour in the Economic Development of Uganda (London:
Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 81; and J. B. Knight, "The Determination of Wages
and Salaries in Uganda," Bulletin of the Oxford Institute of Economics and Statistics 19
(October 1967). (2) Kenya, Statistical Abstract for 1955/56, 1965, 1968, 1969. (3) Nigeria,
see table 1.
table suggests that what one should be asking is: why have wages risen so
little in Nigeria? 26
These data also weaken the trade union power argument in another way.
Though real wages have risen much faster in Kenya and Uganda, there is
little evidence that trade unions have had much role in this process. The
wage increases have largely been the result of colonial and postcolonial
policies, and trade union pressure does not appear to have been a major
factor.27 The lesson to be learned is that one may obscure basic causalities
by attributing every deviation from the ideal Western model of a competi-
tive labor market to trade union behavior.
This leads to my final point. Cohen has questioned my argument that
wage earners as a group may exert pressure on government and represent
a significant political force, without this implying a significant role for trade
26 Ghana is the only country in former British Africa with usable data where real
wages have not risen faster than in Nigeria. J. B. Knight's forthcoming study should
illuminate the Ghana situation.
2 John F. Weeks, "Wage Policy and the Legacy of Colonial Rule: A Comparative
Study of Kenya, Uganda, and Nigeria," Journal of Modern African Studies, forthcoming
1971; also J. B. Knight, "The Determination of Wages and Salaries in Uganda," Bulletin
of the Oxford Institute of Economics and Statistics 19 ( October 1967 ).
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union institutions. A similar mechanism has been suggested by J. B. Knight
in his excellent work on wages and salaries in Uganda.
It may appear from this description that unions in Uganda have not had much influence
on the wage of the majority of workers. Nevertheless, urban workers as a group may
be able to influence government policy to their advantage, even without help of trade
union organization. Urban workers are more conscious politically than the peasantry,
more articulate, more visible to government leaders.2
While one cannot generalize from a single case, the Nigerian experience
indicates what has been discovered almost universally for developed coun-
tries and what Marx argued a century ago-trade unions have considerable
difficulty raising real wages in the long run within a capitalist economy in
the absence of favorable economic conditions.
2 Knight, "Determination of Wages," p. 250, italics added.
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